DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND

LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS

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CONTENTS

Introduction: The Deliberative Turn in Democratic Theory 1

1. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE 8

2. MINIMAL DEMOCRACY? THE SOCIAL CHOICE CRITIQUE 31

3. DIFFERENCE DEMOCRACY: THE CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING GROUP AGAINST THE GENTLEMEN’S CLUB 57

4. INSURGENT DEMOCRACY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE 81

5. TRANSNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE COSMOPOLITAN MODEL 115

6. GREEN DEMOCRACY 140

7. DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY IN A REFLEXIVE MODERNITY 162

Bibliography 176

Index 191
1970 was evidence of the rudimentary nature of democratic politics in closer proximity to the state, and when should the two kinds of action be can only be answered in terms of the political context and the strategies employed by the state. Different times and places, and different actors, will answer, as I will demonstrate.

In previous chapters I highlighted possibilities associated with the public sphere and civil society as political venues for the pursuit of discursive democracy that are in important ways distinct from the state. Earlier I recognized that many deliberative democrats now regard the institutions of the liberal state—constitutional assemblies, legislatures, courts, and public hearings—as the most significant venues for deliberation. An emphasis on the public sphere and civil society does not preclude recognition of these state-based possibilities—for example, in connection with the discursive designs mentioned in Chapter 2. Further, the state remains the main (though not, as I will point out later in this chapter, the sole) entity for making enforceable collective decisions in response to social problems. Moreover, the public sphere only takes shape in the presence of the state—however oppositional the stance taken by its key actors and movements. The discursive democratic well-being of civil society depends crucially on how the state organizes or obstructs interest representation. For all these reasons, a focus on civil society cannot mean turning one’s back on the state.

The key question then becomes that of when should democratic advances be sought in the state, and when should they be sought in the public sphere and civil society? What should be the balance between these two options? Contrary to almost all analysts who have contemplated these questions, I do not believe they admit of any universally valid answers. We should not generalize from the situation in particular liberal democracies at particular times (for example, the present-day United States). Rather, such questions should be investigated in terms that are both comparative and historical. This chapter begins...
such an investigation. The answers turn out to be quite different for
different times, places, and kinds of states.

In previous chapters I paid close attention to the precise definition
of ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’, two concepts central to contemporary
thinking about democracy but contested in their meaning by social
scientists and political theorists. Most simply, the state may be defined
formally as the set of individuals and organizations legally authorized
to make binding decisions for a society. This chapter’s exploration of
the relationship between civil society and the state will enable more
nuanced explication of the relationship between these two concepts,
and so clarification of their meaning in the context of the prospects for
democracy. I will show that ‘the state’ can be characterized in terms
more useful than the simple definition just given, through reference to
a set of imperatives for collective action. The state should not be
equated with the broader set of society’s institutions of government.
The implication for normative democratic theory is that the fact that
particular kinds of political interaction can be observed somewhere
within these institutions does not imply that the form of these inter-
actions can be prescribed straightforwardly for the state.

In practice, key political actors will sometimes face a choice between
action in the public sphere and action within the state. Sometimes
there will be no choice, if for example the state adopts exclusive pat-
terns of interest representation, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of
a particular social movement. When such a choice does arise, as it has
done in the history of many social movements, it may often seem that
there are instrumental benefits to be gained by entry into the state, in
terms of achieving the group’s substantive goals. Such entry can take
many forms, from lobbying through conventional channels to taking
part in co-operative policy-making mechanisms organized by govern-
ment. Yet voices may also be raised warning of being bought off
cheaply, and being co-opted into the existing power structure.

In contemplating any choice between action in civil society and the
state, two kinds of concerns come into play. The first concerns the
substantive goals of the group: are they more likely to be furthered by
action in the public sphere, or more directly through the state? The
second concerns the implications for democracy: does the democratic
gain in terms of a more democratic (because more inclusive) state out-
weigh the democratic loss caused by a less vital and authentically
democratic public sphere?

As I have already indicated, I do not believe that such questions
admit of any universal answers. Rather, from the points of view of
both particular movements and the well-being of democracy as a
whole, the answers will depend upon the particular configuration of circumstances. Different times and places, and different kinds of states, will yield different answers. I will argue in this chapter that, from the point of view of democracy, benign inclusion in the state is possible only when two conditions hold. First, a group’s defining concern must be capable of assimilation to an established or emerging state imperative. Second, civil society’s discursive capacities must not be unduly depleted by the group’s entry into the state. These criteria help determine whether any particular group’s inclusion in the state constitutes a democratic gain or loss, for the group in question and, more importantly, for the polity as a whole. Absent such conditions, oppositional civil society may be a better focus for democratization efforts than the state.

A state imperative is any function that governmental structures must perform if those structures are to secure longevity and stability. Imperatives are always in the interests of public officials. The idea of an ‘autonomous state’ in Skocpol’s (1985) terms is that public officials have collective interests of their own that are not reducible to the interests of a dominant class in society (such as the bourgeoisie in Marxist theory). But imperatives exist irrespective of the desires or preferences of particular public officials, and override these preferences and desires in case of conflict. For example, an incoming government may be elected on a platform of income redistribution and freedom of information about governmental activities, and its leaders may be sincerely committed to these values. But if they find that redistributive policies frighten the markets, and that freedom of information threatens to undermine national security in the face of a hostile international context, these officials’ own interests in avoiding economic crisis (and so maintaining government revenues) and securing the state against adversaries override their preferences.

Examples of state imperatives include the need to keep domestic peace, respond to external threats, prevent capital flight, and raise revenues. The content and relative weight of these imperatives vary with time and place (as I will show later). The existence of such imperatives does not mean that all public officials have to give them priority all of the time. If that were the case, the state would appear as an entity with sharp boundaries, those on the inside pursuing a common purpose, those on the outside free to pursue a variety of interests. In practice, governments feature both internal differences and permeable boundaries, and their different parts can pursue contradictory policies. For example, agriculture ministries or departments will typically make common cause with farmers’ organizations against central budgetary
departments wishing to restrict subsidies and tax concessions for farmers. One department of government may administer subsidies to tobacco growers, while another conducts anti-smoking campaigns. Such internal differences and porous boundaries led almost all American political scientists to banish ‘the state’ from their vocabulary from the 1930s to the 1980s, in favour of the supposedly more realistic and scientific concept of ‘the political system’ (see especially Easton, 1953). However, the concept of the state made a comeback in the 1980s (for a celebration, see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985; for a lament, see Almond, 1988).

How can a preference for ‘the state’ over ‘the political system’ be justified once we accept internal conflict and contradiction in government, along with porous boundaries? The only defensible answer proceeds, I believe, through reference to the idea of imperatives. We can isolate core functions made necessary by these imperatives. When we speak of ‘the state’ in the active voice, it is only these functions that can be at issue. Within this core, the actions of public officials are coordinated so as to be consistent with imperatives (irrespective of the precise wishes of these officials). Though not using the terminology of ‘the state’, Charles Lindblom (1982, p. 335) usefully distinguishes between ‘imprisoned’ and ‘unimprisoned’ zones of policy-making. The imprisoned zone covers the policies that must be pursued—in Lindblom’s case, to keep actual and potential investors happy, though the idea can be generalized to other imperatives. The unimprisoned zone is the residual set of policy areas, featuring more indeterminate political bargaining, conflict, and compromise.

The core functions of the state constitute the essential areas of state activity—indeed, they define the need for the state—and it is these that I will emphasize in all the analysis of this chapter. All significant matters relating to national security and foreign policy, fiscal, monetary and trade policy, the welfare state, civil and criminal justice, environmental and natural resources policy are located in the core. In practice, governments will also be involved in many activities that have little connection to this core. Yet it would be a mistake to define the core and the periphery of government in terms of two fixed and mutually exclusive sets of policy issue areas. For when the stakes become high in just about any issue area, then core functions enter the picture. For example, if policy towards a small indigenous minority is only a matter of removing discrimination and securing equal political rights, then however important such questions may be to the well-being of this minority and to the larger society, the state’s policy core is not at issue. But if the question becomes one of that minority’s claims to a large
land area rich in natural resources or agricultural production, then core economic imperatives do become relevant. Areas such as arts policy or the promotion of sport might have little conceivable connection to the core (assuming that the era of social control through bread and circuses has gone for good)—but they do as soon as the sums of money at issue become large.

In light of the two criteria for guiding choice between action in civil society and through the state that I proposed earlier, concerning respectively connection of a group’s defining interest to a state imperatives and avoidance of depletion of civil society, democratic theorists who advocate a strategy of progressive inclusion of as many groups as possible in the state fail to recognize that the conditions for authentic as opposed to symbolic inclusion here are quite demanding. When these criteria are not met then inclusion in the policy beyond the state is more appropriate. There are times when benign inclusion in the state can occur, but I will conclude that any such inclusive move should also produce exclusions that both facilitate future democratization and guard against any reversal of democratic commitment in state and society. The dynamics of democratization turn out to reveal a subtle interplay between inclusion and exclusion, the state and civil society. The history of the expansion of the effective democratic franchise is largely one of insurgencies beginning in oppositional civil society. Sometimes these insurgencies end up being absorbed by the state, sometimes they do not. Sometimes such absorption is a democratic gain, sometimes a democratic loss. To set the scene for this account of insurgent democracy, let me begin with a closer look at what the basic idea of political inclusion entails.

Democratization as Inclusion

The difference democrats’ critique discussed in the previous chapter highlights the degree to which formal political equality (of the sort that universal adult citizenship rights imply) can in practice mask the continued exclusion, and even oppression, of particular categories of people. Difference democrats are certainly not alone in calling for political change that would lead to the more effective inclusion of a fuller variety of individuals, groups, and categories of people in political life. Deliberative democracy itself began (even if it did not end) as a theory for which democratic legitimacy depends upon the ability of all those subject to a decision to participate in authentic deliberation. As the social choice critics of deliberation have been quick to note, this
implies a commitment to the maximization of free, equal, and authentic access to debate, which should extend to individuals, interests, and groups traditionally excluded from decision-making.

In this light, democracy can be made more substantial and effective through greater efforts to include a variety of disadvantaged categories and groups for which the formal promise of democratic equality has masked continued exclusion or oppression (see Phillips, 1995). This feature of contemporary liberal societies—continued exclusion—provides one basic justification for a focus on democratization to begin with. However, this justification is contingent on a particular set of inequalities. A more general reason for caring about democratization is democracy itself: a democratic society is in important respects one that is continually striving to make democracy better, rather than a settled order of any sort (see Dryzek, 1996, pp. 4–5 for more extensive justification of this point). Democratization can take place along three dimensions: franchise, scope, and authenticity. Franchise refers to the proportion of the population that can participate effectively in politics. Scope is the range of issues under democratic control. And authenticity is the degree to which participation and control are substantive as opposed to symbolic.¹ In this chapter I emphasize franchise, understood as effective inclusion beyond formal citizenship rights. Candidates for such inclusive efforts currently include ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples, women, the old, gays and lesbians, youth, the unemployed, the underclass, recent immigrants, people on the receiving end of environmental risks, and (if only by proxy) future generations.

While recognizing that the effective inclusion of more groups and categories in the polity is central to democratization, in this chapter I want to question any predisposition toward inclusion sponsored by or sought in the state. Entry into the state can come through organization as an interest group and associated lobbying activities, or participation in policy development and implementation through ongoing negotiation between group leaders and public officials, or participation in conventional party and electoral politics either by organizing as a party or in formal affiliation with an established party, or acceptance of governmental appointments by group leaders, or having enhancement of the group's ability to participate in policy-making itself being a target of public policy. This sort of inclusion or entry into the state therefore involves more than the attainment of basic citizenship rights such as the right to vote and associate, which I shall take for granted.

¹ In Dryzek (1996, pp. 5–9) I argue that an advance on any one of these dimensions should never be bought at the expense of a retreat on one of the two others.
Democratic theorists have of course always assumed that the state is the main locus of their concerns; indeed, this assumption is so universal and unremarkable that it is not often even noted. A rare explicit acknowledgment is made by Robert Dahl (1989, p. 37): ‘Advocates of the democratic process have always meant it to be applied to the state.’ I would suggest in contrast that much of the time we should look instead to the polity beyond the state. In the past, the main non-state focus emphasized by democratic theorists was the workplace. More recently, some emphasis has shifted to civil society, and as previous chapters should already indicate, I support this emphasis. Still, the civil society concept remains both contested and ambiguous, especially in terms of its relationship to the state. Here, I wish to do more both to advance this emphasis on civil society, and to clarify its appropriate relationship to the state.

Wariness of political inclusion is common in the ranks of conservatives and classical liberals. Conservatives want to repel destabilizing threats to the established order, and liberals want to protect their project of universal rights assigned equally to individuals irrespective of their characteristics, rather than to particular categories or groups. My own argument for highly selective inclusion is different in that it proceeds from the point of view of democratization itself. It is important to distinguish between inclusion in politics and inclusion in the state. I will attempt to show that democrats, including deliberative democrats, should generally favour a state that is in important aspects exclusive, for exclusion properly arranged can actually benefit democracy and democratization, even from the point of view of those excluded. (That exclusion can do so from the point of those included has been a staple of republican thinking through the ages, from antiquity to Arendt, 1958.)

An examination of the history of democratization indicates that pressures for greater democracy almost always emanate from insurgency in oppositional civil society, rarely or never from the state itself. In most West European countries, the franchise was gradually extended beyond a narrow group of property-holders as a result of agitation from the working class and its organizations (see Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992)—perhaps most famously, the Chartists in early nineteenth-century England. Women’s suffrage was in the pioneer cases the culmination of a long struggle by women themselves, organized into suffragette movements.

If a group leaves the oppositional sphere to enter the state then dominant classes and public officials have less to fear in the way of public protest. There may be democratic gain in this entry, but there is
also democratic loss in terms of a less discursively vital civil society, the erosion of some existing democratic accomplishments, and a reduced likelihood of further democratization in future. Moreover, the democratic gain is itself uncertain. I will argue that such gain can only be secured when the defining interest of the entering group can be connected quite directly to an existing or emerging state imperative. This connection can be made when an equivalence is discovered between the goods sought by a group and some aspect of what the state must do in terms of public policy. If the group’s interest cannot be so assimilated, then the group in question is confined in its operations to peripheral aspects of public policy, or at best receives only symbolic rewards. Such co-option has been a standing concern of observers of the role of groups in democratic systems. Co-option was defined long ago by Selznick (1966, p. 13) as ‘the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence’, though in co-option’s normal pejorative sense such absorption comes without any real power-sharing.  

Before analysing in detail the circumstances in which the different venues for more inclusive democratization are appropriate, let me discuss approaches to inclusion that are unequivocally statist.

**Inclusive States**

Proposals for democratic inclusion have been pursued most assiduously by the difference democrats introduced in the previous chapter, many of whom have turned their attention to how states might be made more inclusive. Difference democrats believe that merely granting members of oppressed groups the same formal rights and the same access to the state as everyone else effectively extinguishes any political manifestation of difference (Young, 1989; 1990). So, for example, indigenous peoples in Canada, the United States, or Australia are enfranchised under ‘one person, one vote’. But given their numbers and geographical dispersal, this effectively denies them any representation in national legislatures. New Zealand has long recognized this problem, and (until the recent reform of the electoral system) set aside a number of Maori seats in parliament.  

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2 For a detailed analysis of the hazards of co-option, especially for resource-poor groups, see Sward (1992).

3 One parliamentary seat in the German land of Schleswig-Holstein is reserved for the tiny Danish minority.
which can exclude disadvantaged groups. Many other aspects of political systems, including cultural aspects, can make it difficult for disadvantaged groups to attain real recognition and access, even when these groups are large.

To some difference democrats, notably Anne Phillips (1993, pp. 96–9), these considerations suggest only measures such as setting aside quotas of seats in parliament for particular categories of people, such as women. Political parties in Scandinavia have adopted quota systems of just this sort, and the British Labour Party has also tried to specify that a certain percentage of its candidates in winnable seats be women. Phillips is otherwise keen to preserve the basic structure of liberal democracy. There is no suggestion that the representatives in question have a special charge to speak for women and only as women; it is enough that they simply are women.

As we saw in Chapter 3, more radical implications are drawn from the principle of difference by Iris Young, who believes that oppressed groups need more than just representatives in the legislature. Groups should also have veto power over policies that affect them, and guarantees that public officials will respond to their concerns. In other words, the group is represented qua group, rather than merely yielding representatives with the characteristics of the group.

Now, the idea that the representation of groups rather than individuals should be the locus of democratic politics is not unique to contemporary difference democrats. Pluralists have always interpreted state-related politics in terms of the interaction of groups, and public policy as the output of that interaction. Mid-century United States pluralists such as David Truman (1951) and Robert Dahl (1956) may not have had the same set of interests in mind as the difference democrats, but they shared an emphasis on different experiences producing different interests which should then be pursued by interest organization through groups.4

These pluralists saw the state in passive terms, as reacting to whatever groups happened to emerge. Given that they recognized few barriers to the emergence of interests and the organization of groups, they saw no need for public authority to intervene to affect the pattern of group representation (though they had no objection to the removal of barriers to group assertiveness, through for example civil rights legislation in the United States). In contrast, difference democrats see a variety of barriers to the emergence, recognition, organization, and

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4 Early 20th-cent. pluralists such as Harold Laski (1919) and Mary Parker Follett (1918) have more in common with contemporary difference democrats than do Truman et al. (see Schlosberg, 1998).
assertiveness of groups. These barriers come mostly in the form of hierarchy and oppression, with cultural and economic as well as political causes. Whereas mid-century US pluralism is passively inclusive in its pattern of representation in that it is prepared to accept whatever constellation of groups society throws towards politics, difference democrats are more attuned to the need for actively inclusive representation, in which efforts are made to promote the ability of groups to recognize an interest and pursue it in politics. In this respect, they reveal a surprising affinity with James Madison’s view of groups, or factions as he would have called them; for Madison too did not believe that a desirable pattern of group representation emerged automatically.

Difference democrats are not always clear as to who does the recognizing and promoting here. Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers (1992) are more forthright in their answer: the state. Sharing with both Madison and difference democrats the recognition that desirable patterns of interest organization and representation do not arise automatically (1992, p. 426), they believe the state should play an active role in sponsoring and certifying groups, removing obstacles to their exercising political influence, and creating channels for that influence to be felt in government. In particular, inequality of representation in their ‘associative democracy’ should be remedied by state promotion of the organization of disadvantaged groups (Cohen and Rogers, 1992, p. 425). The kinds of associations Cohen and Rogers have in mind are mostly economic ones, especially categories of workers. Their emphasis on the economic basis of interest formation is shared by mid-century pluralists, though the latter were not, Dahl excepted, particularly interested in the working class.

State-sponsored association is proposed by Michael Walzer as an antidote to a rampant individualism which is producing ‘dissociated individuals’ who are easy prey for anti-democratic demagogues (Walzer, 1994, p. 189). In the United States at least, Walzer (1991, p. 125) believes conditions have deteriorated to the extent that ‘it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of civil society’. Walzer recommends governmental sponsorship and subsidy for trade unions, for ‘cultural associations’ defined in ethnic or religious terms that provide welfare, education, and health services, for ‘charter schools’ designed and managed by parents and teachers, for tenants’ housing cooperatives, for workers’ co-operatives, and for a wide range of community projects (1994, p. 189). Group life enhanced along these lines.

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5 Here, Walzer echoes the long-standing fear of mass society theorists such as Kornhauser (1959).
Insurgent Democracy  91

1. The term political pluralism is used to denote a situation in which there are multiple political parties and groups that are able to participate in the political process. This is in contrast to the more traditional notion of political pluralism, in which there is a single dominant political party or group. 2. The concept of political pluralism is often associated with the idea of democratic representation, which is the idea that political power should be distributed among different groups and individuals. This is often seen as a way to ensure that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 3. The concept of political pluralism is also often associated with the idea of political competition, which is the idea that different groups and individuals should be able to compete for political power. This is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 4. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 5. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 6. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 7. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 8. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 9. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented. 10. The concept of political pluralism is often seen as a way to ensure that the political process is fair and that the interests of all groups in society are represented.
The latter might agree not to sponsor boycotts, protests, or legal action against polluters and despoilers in return for commitments on the part of government, industry, and labour to anti-pollution measures and wilderness protection. Real-world corporatist systems have shown some signs of extending themselves in this direction. Notably, in Norway moderate environmental groups (such as Friends of the Earth) are partially funded by the state and have a recognized place in corporatist policy-making. Such extension—though for the most part only to interests defined on an economic basis—is exactly what Cohen and Rogers desire.

Iris Young applauds this kind of state-sponsored extension of representation, though she wants it to apply to the whole range of oppressed groups, not just economically-defined ones. Connecting her earlier work on group representation with the idea of associative democracy, she avers in her commentary on Cohen and Rogers that ‘the state could decide to promote the self-organization of members of oppressed groups where such organization is weak, or to provide greater resources to existing associations representing oppressed or disadvantaged groups, and to create compensatory political forms to ensure that such groups have an equal voice in agenda setting and policy formation’ (Young, 1992, p. 532).

Theorists who seek democratization in the shadow of corporatism believe that corporatism’s best quality is its ability actively to include particular interests; the problem is only that historically a very limited range of interests has been included. I will suggest in contrast that the real beauty of corporatism is in its passive exclusion of many interests in society—and that it does this with a state that seems quite good at promoting economic justice at least in comparison to all the alternative forms of state organization that have been tried from time to time (see below for evidence on this last point).

Actively inclusive states exist mostly in the proposals of political theorists such as Cohen and Rogers, Walzer, and Young. Yet there is one real-world example, though not one these theorists are likely to endorse. The Mexican state’s longevity and stability can be attributed to its brilliantly successful incorporation of successive waves of potential troublemakers. Until recently both the means (patronage and coercion) and the ends were authoritarian. But the 1988–94 Salinas administration’s PRONASOL (National Solidarity Campaign) added the trappings of grassroots participatory democracy to centralized state guidance. PRONASOL was directed at the social movement activists involved with the Cardenista opposition, which had probably won the 1988 presidential election (the government claimed other-
 Iris, boycotts, protests, or legal
actions in return for commitments on
the part of the corporatists to
abandon those policies which are viewed as ini-
teresting and damaging to all. Notably, such
groups (such as Friends of the
Environment) have a recognized place in
the political process—though for the most part
in a consultative role. Thus, is exactly what Cohen
(1978) suggests he means by a state-sponsored extension of repre-
sentation to the whole range of self-defined claims, rather than
the traditional ones. Connecting this with the idea of associative
politics advanced by Cohen and Rogers that a state-sponsored repre-
sentation of members of society is weak, or to provide
an alternative to the existing representation of the
oppressed or excluded groups, a compensatory political form
that would not only give them a voice in agenda setting and pol-
political decision making, but which would also enable them
to participate actively in the democratic process.

In the shadow of corporatism
exists an opposition that has
ever been truly active, but that historically a very limited
corporatist model. The oppositional groups have tried in contrast to the
prevailing and democratic tradition of successive waves of poten-
tial political representation and stability can be attributed to
the corporatist model. But the 1988–94 Salinas
Global Solidarity Campaign) also
ally, and the government was unable to prevent
the growth of opposition, which had probably
the organization of peasants, workers, and disadvan-
taged communities. PRONASOL dismantled the opposition and
employed many of its activists (see Carruthers, 1995). Thus could the
Mexican tradition of a strong state dominating a weak civil society
continue, though now with an inclusive democratic aspect, or at least
veneer.

Let me now try to add an historical dimension to the analysis which
will justify suspicion of the actively inclusive state, and so demonstrate
why the Mexican outcome might well follow from the proposals of
actively inclusive democratic theorists, however unstable this outcome
might be to them. I will then outline the consequences of this suspi-
cion for any strategy of democratization, and proceed to consider
where and how democrats might do better.

Inclusion in Historical Perspective

A democratizing strategy of progressive inclusion of as many interests
as possible in the state implies that the content of public policy is
effectively determined. Mid-century pluralists were most explicit
on this point in seeing public policy through a physics analogy as the
resultant of the direction and strength of whatever pressures were
applied by different interest groups. Yet this picture of indeterminacy
is manifestly false, as pluralists such as Dahl and Lindblom themselves
eventually came to recognize. Irrespective of what interest groups
seek, there are certain imperatives that all states simply must meet.
Unfortunately for advocates of state-sponsored group representation
such as Cohen and Rogers and Young, promoting the organization of
disadvantaged groups is not one of them, and I can imagine no scen-
ario under which it becomes one. If so, then to advocate such rep-
of their own population. When states alienate their own upper classes by leaning on them too heavily in order to finance their response to external threats, these classes may withdraw support from the state, allowing revolution to commence. Skocpol applies this analysis to revolution in the agrarian bureaucracies of France, Russia, and China.

Though Skocpol writes as though these three imperatives apply unchangingly to all states, in fact their severe conjunction applies only in a Hobbesian world in which violent international conflict is a normal feature and the economic resource base available to states is more or less fixed. Conditions have changed for states now fortunate enough to belong to the global core, enabling them to meet their imperatives in ways that have had positive consequences for democracy. (Life for states in the global periphery remains more Hobbesian; see Goldgeier and McFaul, 1992 on the difference between the situations of states in the global core and in the periphery.)

The first such modification comes with the rise of capitalist economies, and with them the potential for economic growth on a scale never seen before. States need no longer rely on punitive taxation or confiscation in order to finance themselves against external threats; economic growth can help perform the same function in less painful fashion. Thus the first imperative facing states in capitalist systems is what (post-)Marxists (e.g. Offe, 1984; O'Connor, 1984) call accumulation. States simply must provide the conditions that facilitate capitalist investment and economic growth; if they pursue anti-business policies, then they are punished by ‘capital strike’, recession, falling tax revenues, and unpopularity in the eyes of the public. Block (1977) and Lindblom (1982) have detailed the degree to which this ‘exchange-dependency’ constrains the policies of states; markets, according to Lindblom, ‘imprison’ government policy, and ‘pluralism at most operates only in an unimprisoned zone of policy making’ (Lindblom, 1982: 335). It is markets, especially financial ones, which are the sounding-boards for public policy, not public opinion or parliament. And if policies are constricted, then so is democracy, for policies that contradict the fundamental interests of business must be vetoed, no matter how popular. As Bowles and Gintis (1986, p. 90) put it, ‘the presumed sovereignty of the democratic citizenry fails in the presence of capital strike.’ The ever-increasing mobility of capital across national boundaries intensifies this constraint (Dryzek, 1996, pp. 77–83).

Though today exchange dependency figures mostly as an impediment to democratization, the opposite was once true. The importance of the accumulation imperative in the development of democracy is that it brought the interests of the state and of the emerging bour-
alienate their own upper classes in order to finance their response to withdraw support from the state, and if so, applies this analysis to recent developments in France, Russia, and China.

These three imperatives apply to the international conflict is a necessary condition for states now fortunate enough to meet their positive consequences for democracy remains more Hobbesian; the difference between the situation in the periphery.

These with the rise of capitalist potential for economic growth on a longer rely on punitive taxation to ensure against external threats; the same function in less painful forms in capitalist systems is the accumulation conditions that facilitate capitalism, if they pursue anti-business activities. Capital strike, recession, falling wages of the public. Block (1977) degree to which this exchange of states, markets, according to policy, and pluralism at most operative policy making (Lindblom, 1982: 1) one which are the sounding-opinion or parliament. And if democracy, for policies that contradicts the veto, no matter (1986, p. 90) put it, 'the presumed balance fails in the presence of capital across national boundaries' (1996, pp. 77–83).

Crisis figures mostly as an impediment was once true. The importance of the development of democracy is to include and of the emerging bourgeoise into harmony, and so participation in policy making could be extended to the bourgeoisie. It is easy to forget that the bourgeoisie was once an oppositional force in Western societies, constituting a democratic civil society hostile to the state. Habermas (1989) details the deliberative democratic life of the early bourgeois public sphere, manifested in newspapers, coffee houses, and public association. He also charts the subsequent migration of the bourgeoisie from civil society to the state.

This migration was followed somewhat later by the industrial working class; and again, this development can be related to the shifting content of state imperatives. Capitalism produces an industrial working class; and, as Carl Marx recognized, the conditions of its existence in urban centres and large factories enable it to constitute a political threat to the state in capitalist society. At the time Marx was writing the activists of the organized working class constituted an oppositional sphere that confronted the state. Marx himself thought that this would culminate in revolution. What happened instead is that opposition gave way to inclusion. That choice was far from easy for socialist parties to make, and syndicalists, anarchists, and revolutionary Marxists mounted a protracted resistance to it in the early twentieth century (see Przeworski and Sprague, 1986, pp. 13–28). But for better or for worse, workers' parties and trades unions did come to play significant roles in electoral politics and public policy-making in many industrial societies. However, the degree of their inclusion remains quite variable, reaching a high point in social democratic corporatist societies, and this inclusion has for the most part proved less easy and less complete than the earlier inclusion of the bourgeoisie. Strikes and demonstrations have been, at least until the last decade or so, part of the organized working class's political repertoire.

Industrialization meant that the long-established state imperative of keeping internal order was no longer a matter of control of enough coercive force to keep potential malcontents in line. Far more efficient, if it can be secured, is the voluntary acquiescence of potentially rebellious subordinate social classes and categories to the dominant political-economic order. Thus the imperative of keeping internal order mutates over time into what neo-Marxists or post-Marxists such as Habermas (1975), Offe (1984), and O'Connor (1973) call legitimation. And the most effective device for legitimation so far devised, these authors aver, is the welfare state. In part, the working class can be induced to accept the capitalist political economy if it delivers the goods in terms of material prosperity, in which case legitimation can
be assimilated to accumulation (assuming enough wealth trickles down). But the business cycles and employment insecurity endemic even to growing capitalist systems mean that something more is required, and this is where the Keynesian welfare state comes in. The fact that the Keynesian welfare state is now on the way out, or at least under attack, has some major negative consequences for democratization which I will address shortly.

Legitimation is secured when subordinate classes and categories with the capacity to destabilize the political economy instead support or accept that structure. The best example of such a class or category in industrial societies has often been the working class, though groups defined on an ethnic or religious basis may also possess the capacity to destabilize. The threat to political stability posed by permanent ethnic or religious minorities forms the core of Arend Lijphart’s argument for a consociational state which recognizes and incorporates the organizations of such minorities (see e.g. Lijphart, 1977). (Shortly I will discuss the emergence of another threat to legitimation.) It should be stressed that the legitimation imperative does not reduce to a need for governments to court popularity. If it did, then every interest held by every group in society could be assimilated to the legitimation imperative, and the whole concept of a state imperative would dissolve into pluralism, thus losing all force. Only when the class or category in question has the capacity to destabilize government or block policy effectiveness is legitimation at issue.

Emerging State Imperatives and the Prospects for Inclusion

The moral of the preceding historical tale is that, at least when it comes to action in the vicinity of the core functions of the state, oppositional groupings can only be included in the state in benign fashion when the defining interest of the grouping can be related quite directly to a state imperative. Under this condition, groups can help determine the content of public policy, at a minimum in terms of how imperatives are met (for example, legitimation might be promoted by either universalistic or means tested welfare state programs), and how trade-offs between competing imperatives are made (for example, to what extent should economic growth be sacrificed for the sake of redistribution?).

If the interest of an oppositional group cannot be so related to an imperative, then inclusion means being co-opted or bought off cheaply, like the leaders of environmental interest groups who secured not only access but also employment at high levels in the Clinton
administration, but found themselves unable to achieve much in the way of policy substance. As Jay Hair, leader of the National Wildlife Federation, the largest of the co-opted groups, eventually put it, ‘What started out like a love affair turned out to be date rape’ (quoted in Dowie, 1995, p. 177). The group in question receives symbolic rewards only. Goodin (1980, pp. 123–56) argues that such rewards are defensible if the symbols in question (e.g. religious rituals, flags, seeing a member of one’s ethnic group in the mayor’s chair) have intrinsic value to the group. Symbolic rewards are correspondingly indefensible if they are offered as promissory notes for more tangible goods, but turn out to be substitutes for these goods.

There are, as I pointed out earlier, areas of public policy where state imperatives are at issue only weakly, if at all. In such areas, a group’s defining interest may well have little bearing on any imperative. Thus the degree to which the inclusion of the group in the state is benign is a matter untouched by my foregoing analysis. Yet this possibility provides little relief, for it implies that inclusion in the state is unproblematic only in relatively peripheral policy areas. And even if a group is operating freely in this ‘unimprisoned’ zone of policy-making, this seeming freedom is contingent on the group not transgressing boundaries that threaten the core. For example, gay and lesbian rights groups may lobby successfully for legal recognition of same-sex unions on a par with heterosexual partnerships, with few obvious implications for core imperatives. But if the financial costs to government or private companies (in terms of claims for health benefits, etc.) look like they will be substantial, the economic imperative comes into play.

To the extent public policy remains under the sway of state imperatives, groups whose inclusion coincides with no imperative at all cannot easily find the tangible goods they value advanced. They may be allowed to participate in the policy process, but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them. Anything more would introduce a dangerous degree of indeterminacy into the content of public policy. There is a high price to be paid by any group included on this basis. For if state officials have no compelling reason to include the group anyway, then presumably the group in question must moderate its stance in order to fit with established state imperatives. Moreover, in entering the state the group becomes constrained in the kind of interactions it engages. In particular, the group may have to develop a more hierarchical internal structure in order to produce a stable leadership for government officials to recognize and deal with. Life in the state is, then, bought at the expense of relatively unrestricted democratic interplay and deliberation in the oppositional public sphere. The democratic loss
experienced by entry into the state can, as with the cases of the bourgeois and the working class in the past, be justified through reference to the instrumental benefits so achieved. But if there are few or no instrumental benefits, the loss is harder to justify.

Of the group claims now endorsed by difference democrats and other advocates of inclusion, which if any can be related to established or emerging state imperatives? Their experience in the Clinton White House notwithstanding, I would consider the best claimants to be environmentalists, and the relevant emerging state imperative to be environmental conservation. This imperative itself develops out of the accumulation and legitimation imperatives. Now, accumulation and environmental conservation have traditionally been cast in a zero-sum relationship: economic growth has to be foregone to enjoy environmental values. But recent thinking reconceptualizes this relationship. Albert Weale (1992), among others, argues that the essence of the new environmental politics is ‘ecological modernization’: the idea that economic growth and environmental values now stand in a positive-sum relationship, as a clean environment is good for business. Why? First, a pleasant environment can substitute for monetary income for employees. Second, dirty air and water hurt productivity. Third, consumers increasingly demand environmentally-benign goods and services. Finally, pollution indicates inefficiency in materials usage. Weale argues that ecological modernization has been incorporated into government policy most effectively in Germany; Hajer (1995) compares its limited progress in Britain with its more substantial gains in the Netherlands. In the United States, the kind of green capitalism advocated by Vice-President Albert Gore (1992) is consistent with ecological modernization, though he does not use the term.

Environmental conservation can be linked to the legitimation imperative via Ulrich Beck’s (1992) notion of ‘risk society’. To Beck, politics is increasingly organized around the production and distribution of risks (mostly related to chemical, radioactive, and biotechnological hazards) rather than material goods. Those on the receiving end of risks are so numerous, and so capable of political mobilization, that they threaten the stability of the political-economic order, and so legitimation becomes at issue. In the face of widespread public mistrust of arrogant scientists and technologists and of their corporate and governmental employers, Beck believes that legitimation in risk society can only be achieved by public participation in risk selection, allocation, and amelioration.

Even if the ecological modernizers and risk democrats are correct, not all environmental concerns can be easily assimilated to state
imperatives. Endangered species protection, wilderness preservation (especially when the wilderness contains valuable extractive resources), animal rights (especially when the profits of companies relying on animal testing or factory farming are threatened), and deep ecological conceptions of how to live in relation to nature are some of the aspects of environmentalism not easily assimilated. The solution here might be a ‘velvet divorce’ in which part of the environmental movement enters the state, and part chooses to continue to confront the state from the public sphere. This describes the situation in a number of countries. Until their demise in the early 1990s, Green ‘Fundis’ in Germany maintained a confrontational stance while their ‘Realos’ counterparts pursued an ever more conventional electoral strategy. In the United States, there remains a clear distinction between mainstream environmental groups on the one hand and radicals such as Earth First!, animal liberationists, and networks organized around toxics and environmental justice issues on the other.

One might perhaps analyse contemporary feminism in similar terms: liberal feminism is destined for the state, whereas cultural feminism is more suited to the public sphere. The feminization of work means that women’s concerns about employment can be related to the accumulation imperative, as the removal of discrimination against women can actually be good for business in general. If the patriarchal family is a remnant feudal structure (as Faasd, Resnick, and Wolff, 1994 argue), then capitalism is now destroying feudalism’s last hold-out by bringing women into the paid labour force (see also Beck, 1992, p. 105). The feminization of poverty might indicate that aspects of feminism could be assimilated to the legitimation imperative, given the latter’s association with the welfare state. But given that poverty-stricken female-headed households do not constitute much of a political threat to the established order (in comparison with the organized working class of old), this assimilation seems unlikely. Cultural feminist demands for a different kind of politics based on ethics of care and nurturing have no obvious connection to any state imperative, and so should not expect advances therein, especially if they aspire to anything more than languishing on the periphery of governmental concerns.

To Civil Society

The main alternative to the state as a site for democratization in general, and deliberative democracy in particular, is civil society. As
discussed in Chapter 1, civil society in its politicized sense (that is, the public sphere) consists of self-limiting political association oriented by a relationship to the state, but not seeking any share in state power. Prominent examples of politicized civil society in action would include the early bourgeois public sphere discussed by Habermas (1989), the insurgent ‘free spaces’ in US political history constituted by women, blacks, workers, farmers, and others (Evans and Boyte, 1986), the democratic opposition in Eastern Europe prior to 1989 (Arato, 1993), and, in the West, feminist, anti-nuclear, peace, environmental, and urban new social movements. Such public spheres often feature relatively egalitarian and authentically discursive politics in their internal workings (for further details, see Dryzek, 1996, pp. 47–53). They do not pursue power as interest groups or through electorally-oriented parties; yet they are of course concerned with public affairs. Often this concern casts them in opposition to the state and prominent economic actors, though sometimes state and corporate power can be ignored.

Civil society is a heterogeneous place, home to the Michigan Militia as well as the movements I have mentioned. Other groups may be less hostile to democratic values, but still quite hierarchical—for example, Greenpeace. Not everything in oppositional civil society represents discursive democratic vitality. So how do we distinguish between civil society formations that contribute to democratization and those that do not? It is possible to exclude terrorists of both the left and right on analytic grounds: if a group has no orientation to the state other than seeking its destruction, then that group may be part of civil society, but it is not part of the public sphere. Offe (1985, p. 853) excludes the religious right in the United States and neofascists in Europe from his purview by applying the criterion of commitment to ‘a selective radicalization of ‘modern’ values’. Thus to Offe social movements are relevant to democratization to the degree they fit an account of progress toward fulfilment of modernity’s potential. Offe’s viewpoint dovetails quite easily with my analysis of evolving state imperatives and their relation to changing patterns of inclusion and protest. However, while it is rare in practice, oppositional civil society groups can be both conservative in aims and democratic in internal structure. The US anti-abortion group Operation Rescue might fall into this category. Their conservatism alone does not warrant their dismissal. Nor is hierarchy alone sufficient reason for dismissal: despite its internal hierarchy, Greenpeace contributes to the democratic interplay of oppositional civil society.

It is less easy to see how groups that are both conservative and hierarchical make any such contribution. Yet even here, we should be open
to surprises. There is some evidence to suggest that white supremacist groups can provide a temporary lifeline to troubled young adults, enabling their future integration into more truly ‘civil’ society; and even right-wing militias may actually reduce violence by providing a structured outlet for individuals who would otherwise be off on their own, bombing and killing (Rosenblum, 1998, pp. 9, 16). In evaluating such groups, we need to look at what they actually do for their members, and not just rush to make moral judgements based on the groups’ stated goals.

Self-limitation does not mean that civil society is a powerless realm. Power can be exercised from and in civil society in several ways. First, political action in civil society can change the terms of political discourse, and so affect the content of public policy. The rhetorical achievements of Martin Luther King are exemplary here. As I noted in Chapter 2, King drew upon and reshaped the discourse of American constitutional liberalism in order to advance an agenda of civil rights for African-Americans. The women’s movement has succeeded (not without resistance) in changing the ways in which gender, family, and the dividing line between public and private affairs are conceptualized in policy debates. The communicative power that the public sphere can exert over the state is diffuse and pervasive, felt in the way terms are defined and issues are framed, not in the direct leverage of one actor over another. The relative weight of competing discourses in civil society can have major implications for the content of public policy.

Second, as Tarrow (1994, pp. 184–6) argues in reply to those who believe waves of political protest leave behind only burned-out or co-opted activists, social movements can produce lasting effects in political culture by legitimating particular forms of collective action such as the sit-in, and by establishing a permanent place for issues on the public agenda.

Third, policy-oriented deliberative fora can be constituted within civil society. A good example is the Global Forum which assembled as the civil society counterpart to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio. Composed of non-governmental activists from all over the world, the Global Forum influenced what transpired in the official proceedings of the Conference, in part by shaming and embarrassing some of the official participants. Domestic environmental policy is sometimes influenced by such fora, concerned with issues such as renewable resources (Berger, 1985) and toxic wastes (Fischer, 1993).

Fourth, protest in civil society can create fear of political instability and so draw forth a governmental response. Piven and Cloward (1971)
interpret the history of the US welfare state in these terms: welfare provision increases only in response to unrelentless on the part of the poverty-stricken. Piven and Cloward themselves do not draw any implication that protest should be confined to civil society, and advise the poor to step up their demands on the state through conventional channels. Yet their historical account can be deployed as evidence of the power of civil society over the state.

These four civil society activities involve the more or less democratic exercise of power over the state, but they do not reduce to the inclusion of civil society in the state. In addition, civil society can reclaim power from the state—and from the economy. Indeed, Jänicke (1996) defines civil society in functional terms, as public action in response to failure in government and the economy. This functional definition highlights the idea that civil society can itself feature problem-solving, not merely cheap talk. Thus enforceable collective decisions can sometimes be made without reference to the state, even if the state remains the most significant entity so engaged. Civil society can, then, be home to 'para-governmental' activity, and not simply act as a source of influence over the more obviously governmental activities of the state. There are numerous examples here. When feminists and others speak of 'empowerment' they do not mean influence over government, but rather control of their own lives, facilitated by support groups and the like. Disputes within communities can be settled through alternative dispute resolution without involving courts, as for example in the community boards of San Francisco (Schlosberg, 1995). Community groups (such as churches) can provide social services. Citizens can exercise power directly over economic actors through means such as boycotts of corporations or products. Thus in 1995 Greenpeace organized protests against the Shell Oil corporation's plan to dispose of the redundant Brent Spar oil platform in the North Atlantic. Shell eventually capitulated, much to the annoyance of the British government, which was prepared to use force to dislodge protesters from the platform. Paragovernmental interventions can be less benign: sectarian militias can evict families of a different ethnicity or religion from a neighbourhood (a practice of long standing in Northern Ireland).

A final and somewhat different way in which power can be exercised through civil society is in terms of cultural change affecting power relations. Think, for example, of the extent to which feminism has changed power relationships both within the family and outside (and not just as a consequence of changes in family law). So even if civil society actions leave public policy untouched, they can have real social
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Brent Spar oil platform in the mutilated, much to the annoyance prepared to use force to dislodge governmental interventions can be that families of a different ethnicity (a practice of long standing in

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effectively. Along these lines, Tesh (1993) sees the success of social movements in terms of the changes they produce in ethics, culture, and so behaviour in everyday life, for example in relationships between the sexes, or in the way people conceptualize pollutants and the environmental friendliness of products.

Civil society can constitute a site for democratization because it can be a place where people choose to live their public lives and solve their joint problems. This can be as true for postmodernists such as Connolly (1991a), who conceptualize democracy in terms of the negotiation of identities across difference, as for deliberative democrats. Different again, Hannah Arendt’s democratic ‘oases in the desert’ of a sterile modernity can only be found in civil society. Critics of Arendt argue that she was happy to purchase deliberative democratic authenticity at the expense of democratic franchise. But as Isaac points out, the ‘elites’ populating these oases are self-selected and can come from any social class, ruling over themselves, not over anyone else, which is why a workers’ council can be for Arendt an exemplary ‘elite’ (Isaac, 1994, p. 158).

But why should civil society often be more attractive than the state as a site for democratization, and deliberative democratization in particular? The answer is that it is relatively unconstrained. If we think of political action in civil society in terms of the contestation of discourses rather than voting across alternative positions, then strategic action of the sort whose destructive consequences have been exposed by social choice theory (see Chapter 2) looms less large. Thus deliberation need not be muffled in the interests of strategic advantage. In addition, goals and interests need not be compromised or subordinat-
ed to the pursuit of office or access, and there is less reason to repress the contributions to debate of embarrassing troublemakers. Perhaps most important of all, the indeterminacy of outcome inherent in democracy need not be subordinated to reasons of state. Given that deliberative democratic authenticity consists of communication that induces reflection on preferences in noncoercive fashion, there are therefore several coercive agents of distortion less pervasive in civil society than in the state.

The Democratic Benefits of Exclusive States

There is, then, much to be said for deliberative and democratic life in civil society as opposed to the state. But even if we focus on civil society alone, the state and its structure cannot be ignored, for how states
are organized turns out to have major implications for the democratic vitality of civil society. Research on the history of social movements shows that the way they emerge depends crucially on the character of state structures. Indeed, social movements first emerged only in reaction to the development of the modern nation-state, which, to a much greater extent than its monarchical and feudal predecessors, proved amenable to policy change as a result of social pressure (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, 1975). Yet if the impetus for democratization begins with insurgency in oppositional civil society rather than the state—and historically, I would suggest this has almost always been true—then, counterintuitively, a degree of exclusion in the pattern of state interest representation is desirable in order for civil society and so democracy itself to flourish. But what kind of exclusionary state is at issue here?

I have already noted that inclusive states can be either passive (in the sense of accepting whatever groups society throws up) or active (in taking steps to mobilize particular groups and shepherding them into the state)—and that both passively and actively inclusive states have their hazards for democracy in civil society. Similarly, states that pursue exclusion can do so in either active or passive fashion. Active exclusion implies a state that attacks and undermines the conditions for public association and deliberation in civil society. Passive exclusion implies a state that simply leaves civil society alone.

Examples of these two kinds of exclusion can be found in the histories of both the West and of the former Soviet bloc. In the Soviet bloc, active exclusion characterizes true Stalinism, under which any sign of political organization separate from the state is sought out and snuffed out. With time and the loss of true believers, the Stalinist state’s energies flagged in this respect. The more passive exclusion of half-hearted Stalinism, especially in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, proved far more conducive to the establishment and survival of oppositional public spheres (see Bunce, 1992). Movements such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia had no access to the state, but neither were they obliterated (even though their members were harassed and occasionally imprisoned).

In the West, the main available actively exclusionary form of state interest representation is authoritarian liberalism, practised with varying zeal in the Anglo-American world in the 1980s (and in some cases beyond). Authoritarian liberalism involves maximization of the role of the market in organizing society, in combination with an attack on the conditions of public association and so the deliberative capacities of civil society. Along these lines, Britain under Margaret Thatcher experienced attacks on the ability of trade unions to organize workers,
implications for the democratic history of social movements stands crucially on the character of sentiments first emerged only in reaction to the nation-state, which, to a much greater extent than ever before, to feudal predecessors, proved to be of social pressure (Tilly, Tilly, 1986). Democratization begins with society rather than the state—and history almost always been true—then, on in the pattern of state interest for civil society and so democracy and exclusionary state is at issue here?

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A relatively exclusionary form of state and liberalism, practised with varying intensity in the 1980s (and in some cases involves the maximization of the role of state in combination with an attack on civil society) and so the deliberative capacities of Britain under Margaret Thatcher made unions to organize workers, on press freedom, on the ability of civil servants to divulge information (even about government activities unrelated to national security), on the legal rights of defendants in court cases, on the autonomy of local authorities from central government control, on the independence of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and on the political neutrality of the police (for details, see Kavanagh and Seldon, 1989). Not only the collectivism of the left came under attack; organic 'one nation' Toryism was also destroyed by the Thatcherites. Authoritarian liberals even tried, with some success, to reverse the historical inclusion of the working class in the state. The Trades Unions Congress was expelled from the quasi-corporatist National Economic Development Council, and unions were subjected to new legal restrictions on their ability to organize workers and take industrial action. The inclusion of the working class had never been very pronounced in the United States, but the expulsion of organized labour was symbolized by the Reagan administration's unopposed destruction of PATCO, the air traffic controllers' union, in 1982. In both cases, the legitimation or welfare state imperative associated with the initial inclusion of the working class also came under attack, and more coercive means of social control came back into fashion. All this could happen in part because of de-industrialization and the associated dissolution of the working class. The organized working class became less of a threat than it once was, and so its link to the legitimization imperative could be weakened, if not severed.

These sorts of governmental attacks on the conditions for association in civil society can be hindered, if not prevented, by constitutional restraints. Walzer (1991) argues that the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution protects not just a private realm of individual life, but also an associational realm of civil society. On Walzer's account, the authors of the Bill of Rights assumed the existence of this associational realm, whose subsequent atrophy meant that the Bill came to be interpreted as protecting private individuals rather than public associations. Still, the absence of any comparable constitutional defences in Britain may help explain the relative ease with which the Thatcherite agenda for the individualization of civil society was implemented in the 1980s. Earlier I argued that one should not expect a great deal in the way of positive commitment to the associational life of civil society on the part of governmental officials, the hopes of Walzer and others notwithstanding. However, constitutional and legal defences for civil society should be welcomed when they can be obtained from governments. Beyond the Bill of Rights, other US examples can be found in connection with the 1935 National Labor Relations Act's
establishment of the rights of unions to engage in collective bargain-
ing, civil rights legislation in the 1960s, and more recent changes in family law. Such measures do not have to be accompanied by the entry of the protected associations into the state in the terms I defined at the outset.

Such constitutional and legal restraints are less necessary under corporatism. Corporatism, as I noted earlier, is characterized by a bargain involving government, business, and labour, the terms of which do not allow other interests to have any say in policy formation and implementa-
tion. Corporatist states do not attack or undermine the conditions for public association in civil society; they simply ignore it by offering few channels of access to the state. Thus the passive exclusion associated with corporatism is more benign for democracy in civil society than is the active exclusion of authoritarian liberalism.

Empirical research on social movements, once dominated by social-
psychological work on the attributes and beliefs of movement activists, took a more political turn in the 1980s. The new paradigm focused on how the ‘political opportunity structures’ presented by states affected the form taken by social movements, protests, and ‘contentious politics’ (see e.g. Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1994). The relevant aspects of such structures include the degree of consensus or division within governing elites, the stability or instability of partisanship in leadership configuration, and how closed or open state policy-making structures are. Corporatism features consensus and stable partisanship within governing elites and closed decision-making. Corporatism’s political opportunity structure was therefore conducive to the development of ‘new social movements’ such as those representing environmental, feminist, anti-nuclear, and peace values in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s in countries such as West Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria (Kitschelt, 1988). Such movements developed an unconven-
tional action repertoire, ‘self-limiting’ in that they did not seek a for-
mal share of state power.

The other main line of empirical research on the consequences of corporatism concerns its implications for economic performance and social stability. Most of the extensive literature on this topic concludes that corporatism has been successful in delivering the goods when it comes to growth, income redistribution, and stability, at least for the period from the 1950s to the 1980s (see e.g. Freeman, 1989; Pekkarin, Pohjola, and Rowthorn, 1992). Stability is usually defined in terms of the regulation of class conflict, as measured by industrial disputes. More recently, cross-national comparative work on work on ‘capa-
city-building’ in environmental policy has found that the consensual
style associated with corporatism is conducive to effective environmental outcomes (Jánicek et al., 1997), and that a positive statistical relationship exists between degree of corporatism and environmental policy performance (Scruggs, 1999).

An examination of contemporary states conducted in terms of comparative statics would conclude that corporatism is the state model most conducive to a discursive and democratic civil society (see Dryzek, 1996, pp. 64–70). But a historical extension of the analysis reveals that corporatist states are themselves the product of inclusion in the state of groups previously operating in civil society, first the bourgeoisie and then the organized working class. These two inclusions could proceed only under particular conjunctions of group interest and changing state imperatives. As I have indicated in discussions of environmentalism and the women’s movement, changing circumstances might lead to a revision of this provisional verdict on corporatism, especially if the latter is defined in strictly tripartite terms. The provisional conclusion in favour of passive exclusion, of which tripartite corporatism is the most visible contemporary example, is less easily shaken. (Other examples of passive exclusion would include consociational democracy, featuring government by cooperation among the leaders of historically warring social blocks, normally defined on the basis of religion or ethnicity.)

For better or for worse, corporatist states may continue to change in response to groups operating in civil society claiming access to the state (or indeed forsaking the state in favour of civil society). Sometimes such claims are futile, if the state has no obvious point of access. But even strong corporatist states (classified by Lehbruch, 1984, as Austria, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) sometimes open up access points—for example, for environmentalists in Norway in the 1990s, as I noted earlier. And most contemporary states in developed societies are not strongly corporatist, instead falling somewhere on a continuum between corporatism and pluralism (see Lehbruch, 1984, for a classification of countries in these terms). What, then, should guide the strategic choices of groups when the possibility of access to the state does arise?

Movement Strategy and State Response

Observers of social movement dynamics often argue that eventually there comes a point at which groups have to choose the state over civil society. Given that mass activism is hard to sustain, protest movements
often end up incorporated into the state, at least in liberal democratic societies, if indeed the movement can escape fading into oblivion. More authoritarian systems may see the movement end in repression. To the extent such life cycles are inescapable, then entry into the state (through any, some, or all of the means I defined at the outset) may be a matter of pragmatic necessity, not free strategic choice. Along these lines, Claus Offe (1990) argues that movements normally pass through three stages. The ‘take-off’ phase in civil society is informal, spontaneous, and militant. Such inchoate, unfocused energy fades as the movement moves into what he calls a ‘stagnation’ phase (‘consolidation’ would have fewer pejorative connotations), involving definition of group membership, leadership, and organization. The third stage is ‘institutionalization’, what I have termed inclusion in or entry into the state. Offe believes such institutionalization can be expected as a rational use of limited resources of time, energy, and finance, as a way of sustaining a movement when supporters are not ready to contribute anything more than votes and money. The movement can then ‘cash in’ the resources it has mobilized in its take-off and consolidation phases to achieve access to real political power (Offe, 1990, p. 243). Thus Offe believes entry into the state can be a good bargain. Other observers believe such entry normally means co-option (for example, Lowi, 1971). I would suggest in contrast that one cannot generalize about and evaluate such entry in any sweeping terms. Whether the third stage of the life cycle should be welcomed or lamented depends crucially on the particular configuration of movement interests and state imperatives.

A close look at the historical record casts doubt on this life cycle interpretation of social movements. Offe himself admits that when the available range of public policy solutions to movement concerns is manifestly inadequate, then there are good reasons for a section of the movement to resist institutionalization—an insight he applies to the German Greens (Offe, 1990, pp. 246–7). Rucht (1990) notes that new social movements, in particular environmentalism in France and Germany, have featured simultaneous and sustained action in the state and civil society. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992, pp. 555–7) make a similar observation about feminism in the United States. This record suggests that groups are not locked into any simple life cycle; they do have choices. Faced with such a choice, should a group choose civil society, the state, or both simultaneously?

Cohen and Arato (1992) advance a blanket ‘both’ guideline, which they call a ‘dualistic’ strategy for social movements. They regard the women’s movement as exemplary: ‘The dual logic of feminist politics
... involves a communicative, discursive politics of identity and influence that targets civil and political society and an organized, strategically rational politics of inclusion and reform that is aimed at political and economic institutions’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 550). In civil society, movements would act ‘to redefine identities, to reinterpret norms, and to develop egalitarian, democratic associational forms’ (p. 551). In the state, groups would not only pursue group goals, but also seek the development of a supportive constitutional, legal, and policy context for continued movement activity in civil society. Legislation and policy in turn would draw sustenance from a supportive civil society cultural context (p. 552). A large part of the justification for their dualistic strategy therefore turns out to be the degree to which the state can influence the democratic condition of civil society, for better or for worse.

A similar ‘both’ position is argued by Hilary Wainwright (1994), though for the sake of achievement of substantive group ends rather than the democratic vitality of civil society. She avers that movement goals related to (say) ecological and equity values ‘require democratic decision making with binding national and international authority’ which can only be supplied by the state (Wainwright, 1994, p. 195). Without movement activism in civil society, such public policy action is unlikely (p. 197); but again, echoing Cohen and Arato, ‘non-state forms of political action need a supportive and independent relationship to political power if they are to be effective agents of economic and social change’ (p. 190). Though sympathetic to Offe’s life-cycle reasoning for entry into the state, she believes that parliamentary activity can involve permanent sustenance for the extra-parliamentary movement, rather than constituting a permanent substitute for the latter (Wainwright, 1994, p. 196).

These arguments for a ‘both’ answer or a ‘dualistic’ strategy are on the face of it good ones. But they imply a benign view of the actual or potential motivations of government officials even in the vicinity of state imperatives, motivations that can be reflected in the content of public policy without structural impediment. One might hope that public officials would recognize the need for a discursively lively civil society, and formulate policies to promote it, perhaps even along the lines proposed by Walzer that I discussed earlier. The problem remains that there is absolutely no reason for public officials to behave in the way Walzer suggests, and every reason for them collectively to act otherwise if the strengthening of particular civil society groups clashes with an established state imperative. Walzer’s own agenda of stronger unions, housing co-operatives, workers’ co-operatives, and subsidized
community-based welfare provision promises plenty of trouble along these lines.

Beyond laws protecting basic citizenship rights of expression and association, one should not expect much in the way of positive state action to promote the well-being of civil society. Cohen and Arato and Wainwright might object here that, unlike Walzer, they do not seek much in the way of positive commitment by state actors, merely acceptance of the legitimacy of movement goals, and of the continued linkage of group leaders with more uncompromising extra-parliamentary movement wings. But such tolerance may be stretched to the limit if movement goals, especially as articulated in radical terms by the civil society wing, clash with state imperatives. In this light, let me suggest that two criteria are relevant to any group’s choice between civil society, the state, and a ‘dualistic’ strategy. First, the group should consider whether its defining interest can be assimilated to any state imperative. If the answer is ‘no’, then entry into the state is a poor strategy in instrumental terms, for it is unlikely the group’s goals will be embodied in public policy, and bad from the point of view of democracy, because the vigorous and discursive democratic life of the public sphere has been forsaken in favour of co-option and a politics of symbolic rewards.

This first criterion may not always allow a once-and-for-all answer. I noted earlier that state imperatives change with time. Such changes are not easily predicted. But if they do occur, a group should be prepared to change its choice. Around 1980 it would have been hard to predict the assimilation of environmental concerns to the imperatives of accumulation and legitimation. Developing notions of ecological modernization and risk society have made this assimilation possible, as I noted earlier. In Germany, these developments help to justify the ‘Realo’ Green Party’s eventual choice of wholehearted entry into the state, to the point of coalition government with the Social Democratic Party following the 1998 federal election. (One might argue that these developments are themselves due in part to a social learning process initiated by the Greens, but such learning can issue from civil society just as easily as from or in the state, and so provides no argument for pre-emptive entry into the state.)

Changing state imperatives might also lead a group to reconsider a past decision to enter the state. Such entry may have been a good bargain for the organized working class for most of the twentieth century. More recently, deindustrialization and the consequent decline in the numbers of industrial workers and of the scope of the Keynesian welfare state means that working-class interests are no longer so easily
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aligned with the legitimization imperative as they once were. However,
these developments and difficulties have not persuaded the leadership
of social democratic parties to contemplate a return to oppositional
civil society. To the contrary, their normal response has been strategic
 moderation in the hope of appealing to non-working-class con-
itigencies, or positioning the party to secure what Kitschelt (1994)
calls the ‘pivotal’ vote in coalition politics, having abandoned any
desire to govern on behalf of an electoral majority garnered from the
working class. But this strategic moderation has itself led some
activists to abandon the party in favour of civil society alternatives.

The second criterion to be considered is whether the group’s entry
into the state leaves behind a flourishing civil society. If the answer is
no, then a depleted civil society means a less democratic polity, even
though it might mean a more democratic state. But even the latter is
unlikely. For if all disadvantaged and oppositional groups commit
themselves to conventional political channels, then there is less reason
for the state to include them. In this context, Fisk (1989, pp. 178-9)
argues that ‘Only if there is a continuation of politics by extrapara-
tlementary means will democracy be able to establish limits to the power
of a dominant class,’ because extraparliamentary protest is a standing
warning to this class of what might happen if it is unresponsive to
demands made through conventional channels (see also Wainwright,
1994, p. 197). And of course much is lost with the depletion of civil
society. This loss is not always noted, still less lamented, for example
in connection with the success of socialist parties in electoral politics.
Yet, as Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 184) observe, with this appar-
ent success these parties ‘demobilized those potential efforts—cooper-
atives, councils, and communes—that could not be channelled
through elections; they deprived grassroots initiatives of a chance to
experiment and grow autonomously; they turned nascent movements
into compliance with electoral tactics.’

Consider also, in light of this second criterion, the migration of East
European civil society into the state during and following the success-
ful revolutions of 1989. This migration left behind little or nothing in
terms of oppositional public spheres. The gain was a liberal democratic
state; the loss was in terms of discursive democratic vitality. There
was a real sense of loss experienced by former participants in and
observers of oppositional civil society (see Ash, 1990). Such losses can
also be observed in connection with the entry of the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament into the British Labour Party around 1960, the
entry of the 1960s US civil rights movement into the Democratic
Party, the demise of the ‘Fund’ Greens in Germany in the 1990s, and
the Mexican opposition’s participation in the regime’s PRONASOL initiative after 1988 (discussed earlier).

Now, not all civil society groups care about democracy, be it in their internal workings or in the polity more generally. Some groups might therefore see no reason to apply these two criteria, if it is only the well-being of democracy that is at issue. However, both criteria have an instrumental as well as a democratic aspect. The first criterion asks a group to consider whether its presence in the state will indeed be accompanied by real influence. The second asks the group to contemplate the potential impairment of its influence resulting from the loss of a standing warning to dominant actors attendant upon the group’s wholesale commitment to conventional politics. Thus the two criteria are relevant to group strategy irrespective of the degree of commitment to democracy in general, or deliberative democracy in particular.

Whether a group should choose the state, civil society, or both simultaneously depends on the particular configuration of movement interests and state imperatives. None of these three answers is right for all movements at all times and in all places. I would argue that the popular ‘dualistic’ strategy is appropriate only when some but not all of a movement’s defining interests can be assimilated to state imperatives. As I argued earlier, liberal feminism may be at home in the state, whereas cultural feminism should remain in civil society. Similarly, environmental concerns that can be connected to risk, ecological modernization, or sustainable development can be expressed in state-related action, while the dimensions of environmentalism that pose a more radical challenge to the imperatives of industrial society and its governments belong in civil society. Sometimes the two wings may choose to part company. For example, the emerging network of groups concerned with environmental justice and toxics issues in the United States have distanced themselves from mainstream groups to the point of refusing the label ‘environmentalist.’ On the other hand, mainstream groups may, overtly or covertly, welcome the activities of their more radical counterparts in civil society; note the variety of reactions mainstream environmentalists have to the radical Earth First! group in the United States. At any rate, in such ‘dualistic’ circumstances the identity of the movement as a single entity should also be on its agenda (for an account of these tensions in American environmentalism, see Dowie, 1995).

A group’s calculus in terms of the two criteria will be influenced by the mode of inclusion available to it. No unrestricted choice of mode is at issue here, for different political systems have different opportunity structures. For example, in the United States there are many bar-
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riers and few opportunities made available for new political parties, which is why movement entry to the state normally comes via interest

group politics. Germany, in contrast, provides public subsidy and free

media access for any party once it has gained a small percentage of the vote, but relatively few opportunities for US-style interest groups, and

so inclusion is more likely via a party route. It is hard to generalize about the impact of these variations in opportunity structure, if indeed they do make a difference; a lot depends on the details of particular cases. For example, the national list system of proportional representation in Israeli elections makes inclusion via the party route very easy, but at the same time mandates the specification in very precise detail of a national party hierarchy. Other proportional representation sys-

tems work on a constituency basis, and so provide more scope for local party organizations to retain some autonomy. One might hypothesize that the latter would be more conducive to the continuing democratic vitality of civil society than the former, and so to a ‘dualistic’ movement strategy; but this is just a hypothesis. Observers of social movement dynamics and life cycles rarely draw any distinctions between or make comparisons across the different ways a movement can end up being incorporated in the state, so there is little useful comparative literature to draw on here.

Life-cycle theorists and dualists alike hold that some degree of association with the state is eventually necessary and desirable, if only to maintain a powerful and permanent presence for a movement. But, as I argued earlier, choosing civil society rather than the state does not necessarily imply choosing powerlessness. Nor does this choice imply impermanence. Movement concerns can persist even as movement action is less visible, for civil society can be sustained in social and political networks and reproduced through cultural transformation after more spectacular manifestations of the movement have passed (see Melucci, 1989, p. 206; Tarrow, 1994, pp. 176–7).

Conclusion

Let me now summarize my account of the dynamics of democratization. First, democratization is largely (though not exclusively) a matter of the progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the political life of society. This general inclusion is in turn sometimes manifested in inclusion in the life of the state. However, recognizing that pressures and movements for democratization almost always originate in insurgency in civil society rather than the state, a flourishing
oppositional civil society is the key to further democratization. This sort of civil society is actually facilitated by a passively exclusive state. A truly inclusive state would corrode the discursive vitality of civil society (as the Mexican case illustrates), and so undermine the conditions for further democratization. Thus every historical inclusive step taken by the state should produce a pattern of exclusions as well as inclusions. These exclusions are the seeds for, if nothing else, future and further democratization of the state; and they offer protection against the state reversing its democratic commitments. Exemplary here is the creation of the social democratic corporatist state: labour was explicitly included, a whole range of other groups implicitly excluded by the very way in which labour was included. Thus democrats, even difference democrats, should not interpret democratization as a matter of the state recognizing and welcoming an increasingly diverse range of groups and interests. Inclusion of this sort is only benign when a group's defining interest can be associated with an established or emerging state imperative, and when entry into the state does not unduly deplete the civil society left behind. Occasionally these criteria allow a group to operate in both civil society and the state; but often they dictate that one or the other be chosen.

The analysis of this chapter has proceeded on the assumption that the main alternative venues for democracy and democratization are the state and a civil society whose orientation is given by a particular state. This emphasis is justified on the basis of the continued importance of states, for the present and foreseeable future. Yet today's world increasingly features a migration of the locus of political control away from nation-states, a movement which constitutes one aspect of transnationalization, or globalization at an extreme. The next chapter examines the degree to which democracy in general, and discursive democracy in particular, can also be transnationalized. I will show that the comparative and historical analysis of alternative sites for democratization that I have developed in this chapter can also be applied to international politics, though not in quite such clear-cut fashion.
est into account than via influence exerted by and in transnational civil society. (Thompson himself prefers devices such as a ‘Tribune for non-citizens’—p. 122.)

Institutionalization: The Role of Civil Society Networks in Promoting Deliberation

Any account of democracy (transnational or otherwise) can expect to be asked about the institutions that will house it. In a system and a model of democracy where governance but not government is central, these institutions will not be governmental organizations. But what kind of institutions might promote the communicative processes that I have stressed? Can we identify institutional forms conducive to decentralized, deliberative control of the relative weight of rival discourses? Let me suggest that for the international system no less than domestic politics, the most promising such institutional form currently available is the network, which in turn finds a home in civil society.

Networks of this sort are beginning to appear in international civil society around issues such as the maquiladoras on the South side of the United States–Mexico border (and their tentacles elsewhere). These factories produce goods for the United States market, but their working conditions, rates of pay, and environmental abuses are unacceptable North of the border. Other networks target the production and distribution of landmines, sweatshops producing goods for multinational corporations, and oil refineries (countered by the Oilwatch Network). One such network plays a prominent role in the bioprospecting/biopiracy issue. The nodes of this network are constituted by aggrieved communities, especially in Third World countries, sympathetic activists in the developed world as well as the Third World, and organizations such as the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resources Policy in New Delhi. The network itself is promoted by the Coalition Against Biopiracy (which sponsors the Captain Hook Awards), the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), and the Indigenous Peoples Biodiversity Information Network (IBIN). RAFI styles itself an ‘international civil society organization’. IBIN states that ‘IBIN is not itself a policy-making organization or an information publisher, but will act to aid indigenous organizations and networks form their own information-sharing protocols and help make public information on the Convention on Biological Diversity and related processes more accessible to them’ (http://www.ibin.org/about.htm).
This anti-biopiracy network is at the forefront of the global discursive struggle with the bioprospectors. But it would be a mistake to see the contest in terms of one homogeneous discourse fighting another—such a contest could be organized centrally. Involving as it does a range of activists and communities around the world, the network brings to bear a variety of local experiences and ecological knowledges which help to construct what biopiracy means in practice, and the variety of ways in which it might be countered. The network form implies that the variety of local interpretations and viewpoints has to be taken into account. Given that the individuals involved come from very different places and cultures, differences and commonalities in their experiences are negotiated by deliberation (often at long distance). There is no shared model concerning what should counter the neo-colonialism of biopiracy. Particular responses might involve defensive legal action, more aggressive legal action to pursue the transfer of private property rights in particular patents to local owners, political protest, organizing a boycott of a corporation, civil disobedience, media publicity, or work on an alternative developmental model to counter the inroads of market capitalism. Some members of the network, for example Vandana Shiva (1997), contextualize biopiracy in the structure and operation of the market liberal economic regime, and so what begins as a critique of biopiracy also questions the normative foundations of global capitalism.

The most appropriate available institutional expression of a dispersed capacity to engage in deliberation that helps determine the terms of discourse in the international system and elsewhere is the network. Empirically, it is straightforward to multiply examples. Nevertheless, one can imagine networks that do not exemplify deliberative virtues of openness, respect, reciprocity, communicative competence, and equality in the ability to raise and question points. So is there anything intrinsic to the network form that requires these virtues? There is indeed such a feature, so long as the network has to negotiate variety in subject positions in the absence of any central organizing authority. Variety may come in terms of nationality, ethnicity, social class, or religion. Now, organizations such as political parties, labour unions or monotheistic religions normally deal with variety from the top down, by organizing individuals and groups on the leadership’s terms; but these organizations are not networks. Networks emerge when individuals or groups that are similarly situated in one important respect, but different in most other respects, decide that their common interest would benefit from joint action. When it comes to determination of both the content and process of
joint action, the individuals and groups involved have to develop norms of openness, respect, reciprocity, and equality. Sometimes these norms are formalized into network principles. For example, the Southwest Network for Economic and Environmental Justice has adopted guidelines that specify the rights of all members to be heard, respected, and involved in the network (Schlosberg, 1999, p. 128).

Variety within the network means that they can be few taken-for-granted truths immune to discursive scrutiny. For example, the early environmental justice movement in the United States was composed mostly of urban groups for which it was standard to castigate the mainstream environmental groups for emphasizing the protection of nature and wilderness while ignoring urban pollution issues. At the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991, individuals from these urban groups had to reflect upon and eventually change this perception as a result of encounters with Native American activists for whom the protection of land, nature, and animals was a vital component of environmental justice (Ruffins, 1992). In short: deliberation across variety is a necessary, not a contingent feature of networks, especially transnational networks.

None of this means that the network is the single definitive institutional blueprint for transnational democracy, or the only relevant form (other possibilities include the international discursive designs discussed in Dryzek, 1990a, pp. 90–108). Democracy, in the international system no less than elsewhere, is a quintessentially open-ended project, within boundaries defined by a subject matter pertaining to the collective construction, application, distribution, and limitation of political authority (so open-endedness of the project does not mean democracy can mean anything one likes; see Dryzek, 1996, p. 4). In this project, experimentation with what democracy can mean is an essential part of democracy itself.

Inclusion, Exclusion, and Transnational Civil Society

Any invocation of transnational civil society necessitates an examination of the possibilities for, and consequences of, its inclusion in more formally-constituted political authority structures. This analysis will parallel that I developed for domestic politics in Chapter 4. Do such issues arise in the international system, and what is their implication for the vitality of any incipient democracy in the system? The matter is a bit different when it comes to international politics because there is of course no system-level state in which inclusion can be sought or
offered. Thus inclusion via political parties and electoral politics is impossible. Nor are there background citizenship rights on which civil society groups can draw, though recent work has pointed to the possibility of transnational citizenship, especially in connection with the European Union (Linklater, 1998; Melechior, 1998). Yet there do exist international governmental organizations (IGOs) which can offer inclusion of a sort to civil society groups and their members. Just as in domestic politics, inclusion can take the form of lobbying, participation in policy development and implementation through negotiations, the acceptance of appointment to offices of the IGO by group representatives, and having the well-being of the group made the target of policy. However, the situation is complicated because IGOs themselves work through states, and their power is largely derived from that of the states which constitute them. Thus IGOs respond mostly to the agendas of their component states, and cannot offer inclusion if it might offend one of these states. The states are themselves unequal in the power they exert in the IGO, so offending the government of the United States is generally a more serious proposition than offending the government of Burkina Faso.

These reservations notwithstanding, one can still think about inclusion in an IGO constituting democratic gain by making the IGO more responsive to a wider variety of group needs. For example, the World Bank, long excoriated for the environmentally abusive projects it financed, did by the 1990s open an environmental department and appoint environmentalists to it.

In Chapter 4 I distinguished between passive and active patterns of interest representation, which can be applied to both inclusion and exclusion. In the international system it is hard to imagine an actively exclusive IGO, one that deliberately tries to undermine the conditions of association in transnational civil society. States sometimes try to attack transnational civil society in this manner: for example, when agents of the French government sank Greenpeace’s Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbor. But for states and IGOs alike, it is hard to pursue civil society groups effectively across national boundaries. Indeed, one reason why high-profile groups like the Zapatistas in Mexico and the Ogoni people in Nigeria have sought allies and visibility in transnational civil society is to escape states trying to destroy them.

Actively inclusive representation, in which an IGO would sponsor a civil society group and foster its power within the organization, is possible to imagine, but I can think of no examples in practice, and no discussions of its desirability in theory.
Thus when it comes to both inclusion and exclusion in IGOs, it is the passive form that is at issue. Passive inclusion occurs when the IGO is receptive to lobbying from civil society organizations, welcoming them into negotiations. Agencies of the United Nations with a ‘social’ mission such as UNESCO, UNICEF, the UN Environment Programme, and the Human Rights Commission are receptive to a variety of inputs. Indeed, former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke in 1996 of the need for ‘intergovernmental machinery that is ... more open to civil society’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p. 47). Passive exclusion is also common. The United Nations Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and (until recently and partially) the World Bank do not negotiate with or receive lobbyists from civil society groups; but neither do they do anything to undermine the formation and operation of groups.

In Chapter 4 I introduced two questions that should be asked of groups contemplating migration from civil society to the state. First, can the group’s defining interest be assimilated to an established or emerging imperative of the state? Because they are not part of a state, most IGOs do not face economic, legitimation, or security imperatives of the kind that constrain states. The exception would be those IGOs that have taken on global economic and security functions—exactly those organizations that I have just listed as having adopted exclusionary patterns of interest representation. If these IGOs do ever open themselves up to more inclusive representation, the first question does come into play. In the case of environmentalists entering the World Bank, the answer was eventually a clear ‘no’, so the entry proved a poor bargain in instrumental terms, and bad for democracy, because the inclusion proved only symbolic, not substantive. What this suggests is that recent calls to open up the core economic and security IGOs to a wider variety of participants and inputs in the name of cosmopolitan democracy may actually produce bad results for democracy in the international system as a whole. Just as in domestic politics, passively exclusive authority structures can actually benefit the democratic vitality of civil society. NGOs are less beholden to the agendas of states than are IGOs.

The second question introduced in Chapter 4 enters whether or not any imperative is at issue. We should ask whether the group’s close association with the IGO would unduly deplete oppositional civil society, leaving the latter less vital and democratic. Just as in the domestic case, such association can constitute an intrinsic democratic loss, even though there may be democratic gain in terms of the IGO’s
operation. This loss can be additionally severe given that initiatives for further democratization almost always begin in oppositional civil society, no less in international than in domestic politics. Indeed, the very reason that democratization of the international system is now on the agenda is because of the efforts of myriad non-governmental organizations and activists. It is hard to think of an example of a group that has completely forsaken oppositional transnational civil society for close association with an IGO, but that may because the available IGOs are themselves quite weak, so not a good bargain in instrumental terms. The stronger ones remain passively exclusive and so off-limits to inclusion; which, as I have suggested, may not be a bad thing.

Conclusion

The evaporation of the cold war context means that there is a world to create, as well as accommodate, through a politics that can have its own reshaping perpetually in mind. The international system still involves much more in the way of governance than of government. Most of the government that does exist (in the form of organizations such as the UN, WTO, or EU) is not at all democratic, which suggests that transnational democrats might usefully focus their efforts on the governance. Here, the role played by international civil society is crucial; I have argued that the network form in particular can play a key part in establishing deliberative democratic control over the terms of political discourse and so the operation of governance in the international system. More self-conscious political reshaping can come in the form of thinking constitutively about discourses.

Despite these positive prospects, the struggle for transnational democracy also faces some fairly major obstacles. Today we are indeed witnessing the sort of transnationalization of civil society which I have emphasized. But we are also witnessing powerful economic transnationalization. International trade is not of course new, but the discourses and institutions associated with free trade and economic development imperatives are stronger and more confident than ever before. The constraints they impose are both discursive and material. I have already noted that market liberalism is powerful as a discourse. But even if people resist the discourse, they may find themselves unable to resist material economic imperatives. States in particular are heavily constrained: the first concern of any state operating in the international economic system is to maintain and cultivate the confidence of actual and potential investors. Correspondingly, the main fear
of any state is disinvestment and capital flight. So even if governments want to (say) introduce a progressive and redistributive social policy, they may find these impersonal economic constraints militating against it. On the one hand, these constraints on the state further justify democratization in civil society rather than the state. On the other hand, the same constraints enable states to resist pressure from transnational civil society.

Thus in addition to discursive contests, the international system also hosts a conflict between material forces and discursive ones (with echoes of the clash between Marxist materialism and Hegelian idealism). The prospects for democracy are positive to the extent that discursive processes involving transnational civil society can make themselves felt in reflexive reconstruction of the international political economy. This is a tall order; the prospects are in many ways more positive than ever before, but a major struggle with market liberalism as a material force as well as a discourse looms.